Rethinking Forensic Science Funding in England & Wales

Find the money. 3x to 5x the current market size. Ringfence it. Take the burden of managing the market from the police, they are hopeless at it. Make key structual reforms to the funding model.

I really liked the APPG report (above) for its in depth analysis of the status of the forensic science services market in England and Wales, its candour and its message for urgent reform.

Where it ran out of steam a bit, was in the recommendations for reform that makes sense on a day to day basis. I'm attempting to build a picture of boots on the ground type reforms that could make that reform a reality. All roads start with funding of course.

Forensic science is the invisible backbone of the criminal justice system. Every conviction, every acquittal, every reassurance that justice has been done depends on the reliability of forensic evidence. Yet in England and Wales, the market for forensic science services is in crisis. This entire substack has been largely dedicated to describing the descent of a world renowned system into chaos in the hope that millennial and gen Z specialist advisors in the UK government might find it and use Chat GPT to figure out what the feck this fella is banging on about.

The reasons for the chaos are many, but at the heart of the issue lies a funding model that is both fragile and structurally flawed.

Of course, size matters 😉 when it comes to funding but size of funding is an easy discussion to have. Start with a minimum of matching what the Scots spend per capita and build to something truly transformative. At the moment (2025) that means increasing the existing size of the market (approx £100mill) 3x-5x on external spend.

The Current Funding Model: A Systemic Weakness

At present, funding for forensic science comes from the operational budgets of 43 separate police forces. This means that forensic services must compete directly with frontline policing priorities including tyres, coffee, shoes and even forensic services conducted internally within police forces in direct competition with their external supplier¹. When resources are tight, forensic science is often the first to be squeezed particularly if that spend is viewed as a spend which does not directly benefit the police force. Buy tyres for your police car, you can move police officers around. Buy a DNA analysis, you may or may not get an output that benefits the police. So they’ll buy more tyres and spend less on DNA, this month…hmmm...and maybe next month too.

Chief Constable Simpson: … Some PCCs have definitely indicated the protection of front‑line services, which means savings have had to be made elsewhere, whether that is middle office or back office, some of which forensics will fall into; and some will see themselves as very much front‑line services. Therefore, it is inevitable that areas not classed as front line, whether or not that is visible policing, have had to make significant savings, and we have seen that through various areas of collaboration and getting best value from what we have. In my own area in the south‑west we have made 18% savings, while still delivering the same service, in order to ensure that the budgets balance at the end of the comprehensive spending review. There has been rationalisation within forensic science services, but as a result of ensuring value for money and the most effective and efficient way of doing business.

From a strategic perspective, this creates a collective action problem. Each police force acts rationally to maximise its own short-term priorities, but collectively, the system underfunds a service that is vital for all. The result is chronic instability in the market. Suppliers are squeezed on cost, R&D has collapsed², and smaller competitors struggle to survive.

This is not just a funding issue. It is a funding model problem.

A Tragedy of the Commons

In game theory terms, the forensic funding structure resembles a tragedy of the commons. Each force is incentivised to "defect"—cutting forensic budgets to prioritise visible policing. Yet when all forces act this way, the shared resource (a functioning forensic science market) degrades.

The Nash equilibrium under the current rules is clear: underfunding and market fragility. To escape it, government must change the rules of the game through mechanism design—restructuring incentives so that cooperation, not defection, is the rational choice.

Policy Solutions: Changing the Rules of the Game

There are several routes to reform, all of which involve shifting the funding model away from fragmented, discretionary local budgets.

1. Ring-Fenced National Funding

The simplest step is to centralise forensic budgets within government. If that has to be the Home Office, so be it, but I would argue for braver reform and recognise forensic spend as a criminal justice spend shared between the Home Office on the prosecution side, and the Ministry of Justice for “guardianship” ensuring that the CJS is protected from abusive practices that raise the risks of miscarriages of justice³. By ring-fencing funding, government ensures that forensic services are protected from local budget trade-offs. On the prosecution side this would bring forensic science in line with counter-terrorism policing, which is funded nationally to avoid uneven prioritisation. It also aligns with a similar model in Scotland. On the defence side this would rescue funding for defence experts from the legal aid budget which, through flawed models of procurement is not fit for purpose for a properly functioning CJS demanding an equality of arms.

2. Consortium Procurement

I would argue that centralisation is the only choice now for a reformed system. If however, centralisation is politically difficult, pooled procurement offers another pathway, but attempts by police forces to do this through the Forensic Capability Network and the Blue Light blah blah blah⁴ have largely been a disaster acting merely to reinforce the status quo of the market, excluding competition, forcing suppliers to consolidate into its current untenable position or a near monopoly.

A single buyer consortium, independent from the police, answerable to the Home Office and the MOJ could manage demand collectively. Contracts should be deliberately structured (“sliced”) to allow space for SMEs and new entrants, preventing a single provider from dominating the market, a position that must not be allowed to happen because it is 💯against the public interest.

• Create a single buyer consortium independent from police.

• Act collectively instead of in fragmented mini-games from 43 police forces. Bargaining power shifts to the consortium, but contract design can slice work into smaller tranches to foster multiple suppliers. Contract design should be opened to let SMEs in, not exclude them on the basis that whilst they provide 90% of a current lot specification by volume of casework typically submitted, their failure to service the remaining 10% of the lot which is low volume and infrequently required acts to exclude them from the market entirely; or that they are required to provide services in areas of specialisation that have really no correlation with each other from a commercial perspective (Marks and Traces for example, why should an SME specialising in complex chemical analysis of trace evidence be required to provide a service in footwear marks?)

• Guarantees predictable volumes to support innovation, while still protecting smaller suppliers. Volumes should be based on data of the demand within the CJS, not on the capacity of current suppliers (or lack of) or on the perception of the demand or value of any given service within police forces.

3. Matched Funding Incentives

Government could use matched funding to align incentives. For every £1 a police force spends on forensic services from SMEs, the Home Office could contribute another £1. This creates a coordination game where local forces have incentives to maintain or increase spend, because every £1 buys £2 of service.

This transforms the game from one where underinvestment is rational to one where increasing and/or maintaining spend is rewarded. Agile nimble and innovative SMEs gain market share in the specific areas where they are strongest and where they may not necessarily be in direct competition with the larger FSPs.

Defection (cutting forensic budgets) is punished by loss of central matched funding. Cooperation (sustaining investment) is rewarded.

4. An Innovation Levy

The forensic market’s collapse in R&D is a long-term risk. One solution is an innovation levy: requiring all contracts above a certain value to allocate 1–2% towards a Forensic Science Innovation Fund. This spreads the cost across the market, ensures ongoing research, and reduces dependence on any single provider’s goodwill.

• Mechanism: Require all forensic contracts above a threshold to contribute 1–2% of contract value into a Forensic Science Innovation Fund.

• Funding source: Ultimately police budgets, but it is hidden as a built-in market mechanism rather than a discretionary line item.

• Benefit: Ensures R&D is funded sustainably without relying on Eurofins alone

• Game shift: All suppliers know they must contribute, preventing free-riding.

5. Justice System Framing

Finally, forensic science should be reframed as justice infrastructure, not just a policing tool. Courts, prosecutors, and defence lawyers all rely on it. By repositioning funding as a shared responsibility across the Ministry of Justice and Home Office, government can reflect its true systemic role.

From Tragedy to Coordination

The current equilibrium is unstable: underfunding leads to monopolisation, stagnation, and higher risks of miscarriages of justice. But with reforms, the system could shift into a coordination game—one where stable, predictable funding sustains a competitive market, multiple suppliers can thrive, and innovation is rewarded.

In this new equilibrium:

• Eurofins continues to provide capacity but contributes to shared R&D.

• Key Forensic Services and new entrants fill specialist niches.

• Police forces secure high-quality evidence without destabilising the market.

• The criminal justice system gains resilience and reliability.

Conclusion

Forensic science is not a discretionary budget line. It is a public good, essential to justice, fairness, and trust in the rule of law. Leaving it to compete with tyres for vehicles, boots and duplicated internal forensic provisions in 43 separate budgets has created a fragile, monopolised market that undermines justice itself.

The solution lies in funding reform. By ring-fencing budgets, centralizing procurement, incentivising spend, and investing in innovation, government can redesign the rules of the game. The result would be a resilient forensic science market that serves justice, encourages innovation, and restores confidence.

If these solutions or solutions like them are too much politically, the government faces an uncontrolled collapse of the market and an emergency nationalisation which would be at a cost far in excess of the most fundamental of market reforms.

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Forensic science funding is policy design in its purest form. If we change the incentives, we change the outcomes.

1. Yes that sounds as mental as it is real.

2. R&D as a spend does not even warrant a mention on the company accounts of Eurofins Forensic Services Limited, whilst Cellmark Forensic Services, post acquisition by Eurofins Scientific, has reduced its annual spend of £0.5mill-£1.mill to zero.

3. Yes this means spending on the defence is recognised within a national spend on forensic science together with the prosecution spend.

4. Sorry I’ve just heard this system or variations of it as solutions for the problem for the last 15 years that I bore myself typing about it